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I. THE RISKS AND REWARDS OF STATE-BUILDING
The state is arguably the most powerful technology ever created
by man. The invention of the modern state in Europe half a
millennium ago revolutionized life for many on the planet. By
consolidating control over the means of violence, the state imposed
social order and provided its citizens with security and protection
against both internal and external threats.1 By securing property
rights, enforcing contracts, establishing financial systems, and
organizing markets, the state has facilitated economic growth and
prosperity. And by providing collective goods like education,
scientific knowledge, public health, and social welfare programs,
the state has further improved the life prospects of its citizens and
created new opportunities for human flourishing. Hobbes had a
point: without the state, life for many in the world would be much
more “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”2
Like other powerful technologies, however, the state can be used
not just for good but for evil. Rather than investing in the human
capital of its citizens, the state can subject them to totalitarian
oppression. Rather than creating wealth, the state can confiscate it.
The same control over the means of violence that can be used to
keep the peace can also be used for mass warfare or brutal repres-
sion. Whatever else the modern state has accomplished, it is also
responsible for the Holocaust and Stalin’s Soviet Union.
Indeed, the modern state was originally invented and designed
to kill. In Charles Tilly’s memorable summation, “states make war
and war makes states.”3 Engaged in perpetual warfare and desper-
ate for resources to bolster their military might, European kings
came to see that they could support large armies by extracting
1. Steven Pinker credits the state with playing a leading role in the historical decline
of violence over recent centuries. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 680-82 (2012).
2. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88-89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1651).
3. CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 990-1992 (1992);
Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in BRINGING THE STATE
BACK IN 169 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985).
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wealth from populations under their control and protection.4 This
led them to build bureaucratic infrastructures for the purposes of
taxation and conscription of military manpower.5 Eventually, kings
figured out that by creating a legal system and supporting trade,
they could increase their tax base and thus grow their resources for
fighting wars and accumulating territory.6 Over time, administra-
tive capabilities built up for fiscal and military purposes found new
uses, and the state provided additional public goods to meet the
demands of its citizens and to ensure their ongoing cooperation.7 At
the end of this developmental road stands the modern state as we
know it: capable of delivering the quality of life of contemporary
Denmark; but also of North Korea.
Viewed as a technology of social organization, then, the state is
a decidedly mixed blessing. Like other potentially valuable but also
dangerous technologies—think of nuclear energy, biotechnology, or
the Internet—the state comes with enormous upsides, but also with
rather significant downside risks. We might call this the fundamen-
tal dilemma of state power: a state that is powerful enough to
deliver valuable goods is also powerful enough to inflict great
harms.8
The dilemma of state power is confronted both by those who live
within the boundaries of the state and those who are outside of it.
What we call “the state” has two faces, one international and one
domestic. From an international perspective, the sovereign nation-
state is the primary organizational unit of the Westphalian order.9
From a domestic perspective, the “state” is synonymous with an
4. Borrowing was the revenue-generating strategy of first resort, but kings could not
procure credit without demonstrating the ability eventually to repay debt through tax
revenues. See Tilly, supra note 3, at 172.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 175-76.
8. As Barry Weingast puts it, “[t]he fundamental political dilemma of an economic
system” is that “[a] government strong enough to protect property rights ... is also strong
enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens.” Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of
Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 1, 1 (1995). Of course, the point is hardly limited to property. Any government
powerful enough to provide security and promote prosperity for its citizens is also powerful
enough to immiserate and oppress them. 
9. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism as Westphalian Liberalism, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 769 (2006).
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institutionalized system of government that exercises compulsory
control over a territory and a population. Both the international and
domestic faces of the state can be friendly or threatening.
Internationally, foreign states are both potential enemies and
allies; often both at once. The traditional realist view of interna-
tional relations emphasizes the former, portraying sovereign states
as above all else rivals competing for relative gains in economic and
military power.10 But states also pursue mutual benefits through
various forms of cooperation, ranging from security alliances and
cross-border trade to multilateral efforts to address global warming.
Any sensible foreign policy, therefore, will balance the benefits of
cooperation with economically or militarily powerful partners
against realist concerns about relative power and vulnerability.
This is how the fundamental dilemma of state power plays out on
the international stage. Domestically, the dual examples of
Denmark and North Korea should suffice to illustrate the dilemma
posed by states with substantial control over the life prospects of
their citizens.
Not surprisingly, then, we are often of two minds about state
power. Sometimes we see states as an obvious good—so much so
that we are willing to invest enormous resources in projects of
“state-building.” As has become increasingly clear in the post-9/11
world, “weak” or “failed” states not only threaten their own
populations, but also export harms to people in other parts of the
world.11 The absence of effective state power can result in ethnic
conflict, genocide, and famine; it can also breed global terrorist
organizations, drug trafficking networks, and pandemic diseases.
America’s ambitious state-building projects in Iraq and Afghanistan
are a testament to the perceived value of well-developed states.12
So, too, are the investments of the international community in
state-building as a strategy of economic development. In recent
decades, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
other development policy leaders have emphasized the importance
10. See, e.g., Robert W. Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond Interna-
tional Relations Theory, 10 MILLENNIUM: J. INT’L STUD. 126, 130-31 (2009).
11. Francis Fukuyama, The Imperative of State-Building, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 17, 17-18
(2004).
12. See id. at 18.
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of building political institutions capable of enforcing property rights
and the rule of law, delivering education and health care, and
performing other basic governmental functions that facilitate
economic growth.13 The catch phrases are “governance matters” and
“getting to Denmark.”14
But building powerful states is far from an unambiguous good.
Certainly from an American foreign policy perspective, and perhaps
also from a global humanitarian one, there are some states that are
too powerful. Think of China today or the Soviet Union a generation
ago. (Of course, many people in the rest of the world would think of
the United States.) In fact, the very same states the United States
is helping to build may someday evolve into threats. As much as the
United States could benefit from strong and cohesive governments
in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is far from clear that these states will
be American allies rather than enemies. If Iraq emerges as a
“Frankenstein’s monster” of the Gulf,15 as some fear, then the
United States might look back on its state-building efforts there
with some measure of regret.
State-building as a strategy of economic development also carries
risks. The recent emphasis on strengthening political institutions
is a striking reversal of the “Washington Consensus” that prevailed
in the 1980s and 1990s. Driven by fears that a well-developed state
apparatus would be used to suppress or distort free markets,
13. See Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters (World Bank Institute, Policy
Research Working Paper No. 2196, 1999).
14. Id.; see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING 22 (2004). From this perspective, the
poverty that afflicts most of Africa is attributed increasingly to state failure, which, in turn,
is at least partially attributable to a historical path of development that did not include the
continuous warfare and demands for militarization that characterized early modern Europe.
See JEFFREY HERBST, STATES AND POWER IN AFRICA (2000); see also PAUL COLLIER, WARS,
GUNS, AND VOTES 182-85 (2009) (considering the possibility that the path to development in
contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, following the example of European state-building, might
be to encourage greater military rivalry among states).
15. See Kenneth M. Pollack et al., Unfinished Business: An American Strategy for Iraq
Moving Forward 6 (Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Analysis Paper No. 22,
2010) (“Washington needs to remain wary of building another Iraqi Frankenstein’s monster,
as it did to some extent with Saddam himself in the 1980s.”). Osama bin Laden and the
Taliban in Afghanistan could also be described as America’s Frankenstein, inasmuch as their
power was built through American aid to bin Laden and other mujahideen fighting against
Soviet occupation. See A Bitter Harvest, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 2001, at 19.
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development policy leaders had embraced the mantra of “privatize,
privatize, privatize.”16
In these and other contexts, the double-edged sword of state
power makes state-building a questionable goal. Indeed, when the
risks of state power are sufficiently great, state-building may be
moving in the wrong direction; state-unbuilding might be the better
course. Two historical examples illustrate the point.
A. Morgenthau Versus Marshall
The most celebrated state-building project of the twentieth
century is the post-World War II Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan
is widely credited for the successful reconstruction of Europe after
the devastation of the war, and, beyond that, for the lasting peace
and prosperity of the Pax Europaea and the emergence of an
economically and politically integrated European Union with
Germany at its center.17 At the close of the war, however, the
rebuilding of Germany was far from a foregone conclusion. The best
way to handle a German state that had displayed its belligerence
twice in a generation and had just brought about global catastrophe
on an unprecedented scale was by no means obvious.18
Two competing positions emerged among President Roosevelt’s
advisors. State Department officials made the case for the economic
reconstruction of Germany, along with the rest of Western Europe.19
They argued that rebuilding European economies was crucial, not
just for the well-being of the European people, but also for U.S.
16. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 14, at 19 (quoting Milton Friedman). No doubt there is
some truth to both views: development can be hindered by states that are too weak or too
strong. See Daron Acemoglu, Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States, 52 J.
MONETARY ECON. 1199 (2005).
17. See William I. Hitchcock, The Marshall Plan and the Creation of the West, in 1 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR 154, 154, 160, 173-74 (Melvyn P. Leffler & Odd Arne
Westad eds., 2010).
18. See Hans-Peter Schwarz, The Division of Germany, 1945-1949, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR, supra note 17, at 133, 133-34.
19. See Elizabeth Borgwardt, Re-examining Nuremberg as a New Deal Institution:
Politics, Culture, and the Limits of Law in Generating Human Rights Norms, 23 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 401, 414 (2005).
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trade.20 They also pointed out that an impoverished Europe would
be fertile grounds for the growth of communism.21
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. took a different view.
His single-minded focus was to permanently destroy Germany’s war
making capacity. Morgenthau’s “Program to Prevent Germany from
Starting a World War III” included not just complete demilitariza-
tion, but also the destruction of the nation’s industrial capacity and
dismemberment of its territory.22 Rather than rebuilding Germany,
the Morgenthau Plan called for demolishing its factories, flooding
its mines, clear-cutting its forests, reallocating strategically
important territories to France and Poland, and dividing what was
left of the country into two independent states, South and North.23
The goal was to transform the remnants of Germany into a small,
pastoral state populated by peaceful farmers.24
This is the program that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
was initially persuaded to embrace.25 (Roosevelt had fond memories
of a bucolic Germany from his rambles around the German
countryside as a child.)26 Fairly quickly, however, the United States
reconsidered.27 Confronted with a slowly starving population reliant
on U.S. aid to survive and dim prospects for economic recovery in
Europe without the engine of German industry, American officials
questioned the wisdom of Morgenthauian immiseration.28 And then
there was the increasingly urgent goal of preventing the spread of
Soviet communism.29 As Occupation General Lucius Clay put it,
“There is no choice between becoming a Communist on 1500
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CONFERENCE
AT QUEBEC 1944, at 128-43 (1944).
23. Id.
24. As Winston Churchill would describe the basic thrust, Germany was to be changed
“into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.” See JOHN DIETRICH, THE
MORGENTHAU PLAN 64 (2d ed. 2013).
25. See MICHAEL BESCHLOSS, THE CONQUERORS: ROOSEVELT, TRUMAN AND THE DESTRUC-
TION OF HITLER’S GERMANY, 1941-1945, at 132 (2003). 
26. See JAMES MCALLISTER, NO EXIT: AMERICA AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM, 1943-1954,
at 52 (2002).
27. Id. at 55.
28. Id. at 78-79.
29. See id. at 79.
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calories and a believer in democracy on 1000 calories.”30 By the time
President Truman appointed retired general George Marshall as
Secretary of State in January of 1947, a consensus was building
against the Morgenthau approach and in favor of reversing course.
So the Morgenthau Plan was out and the Marshall Plan was in.
From 1948 to 1951, the United States poured billions of dollars of
financial aid into Europe.31 By the time Marshall Plan support
ended, the economic output of every European state had grown to
surpass pre-War levels, and political stability had been restored.32
West Germany’s remarkable economic growth in the 1950s is now
described as the Wirtschaftswunder, or economic miracle.33 But of
course, Europeans were not the only beneficiaries. European
economic growth was a boon to the U.S. economy, making Europe-
ans wealthy enough to buy U.S. exports and facilitating interna-
tional trade.34 Marshall Plan aid was also earmarked for rebuilding
the militaries of Western Europe as a line of defense against Soviet
expansion.35
As Germany has grown into an economic and political power-
house, doubts about the Marshall Plan program have from time to
time resurfaced. Echoing Morgenthau, opponents of Germany’s
1990 reunification saw a renewed threat of militarism and Nazism.
Margaret Thatcher, who carried in her purse a map of Germany’s
bloated wartime borders, warned European leaders at a summit in
1989, “We have beaten the Germans twice. Now they’re back.”36
Similar grumblings were heard during the recent European
30. BESCHLOSS, supra note 25, at 273.
31. See Hitchcock, supra note 17, at 154.
32. See id. at 161, 165-66. How much credit the Marshall Plan deserves for post-War
economic growth is a topic of ongoing debate. See Lucrezia Reichlin, The Marshall Plan
Reconsidered, in EUROPE’S POST-WAR RECOVERY 39, 40-41 (Barry Eichengreen ed., 1995).
33. Hitchcock, supra note 17, at 163.
34. See id. at 172-73.
35. See MICHAEL J. HOGAN, THE MARSHALL PLAN: AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1947-1952, at 337-38 (1987). Starting in the mid-
1950s, Germany itself would eventually build a new military force under the command
structure of NATO. The reborn German military was designed as a strictly defensive force,
aimed at deterring a Warsaw Bloc attack. See Jonathan M. House, The European Defense
Community, in REARMING GERMANY 73, 90-91 (James S. Corum ed., 2011).
36. Luke Harding, Kohl Tells of Being Battered by Iron Lady, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 2,
2005), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/nov/03/germany.past [http://perma.cc/JTF5-
K3VE].
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financial crisis, as newspapers in Southern Europe ran cartoons
depicting Chancellor Angela Merkel wearing a Hitler moustache.37
Nonetheless, after decades of normalization, democracy, and in-
tegration into an increasingly unified Europe, Germany is now
widely, if warily, accepted by its European confederates and the
United States as a peaceful ally and a partner in economic prosper-
ity. The Marshall Plan has gone down in history as a great triumph
of state-building.
B. Anti-Federalists Versus Federalists
The design and ratification of the U.S. Constitution was also an
ambitious project of state-building. Many Americans at the
Founding sought a strong, centralized government capable of
standing toe-to-toe with developed European states and asserting
America’s commercial and territorial interests.38 Such a government
would need the power to borrow (and repay) money, raise taxes,
regulate commerce, promote trade, and fight wars. These were the
definitive powers of the European “fiscal-military” state of the
eighteenth century, focused on the tasks of revenue raising and war
making.39
Held to that standard, the national state created under the
Articles of Confederation was pathetically weak—if it could even be
considered a state at all. Dependent upon unenforceable requisi-
tions from the state governments, the Continental Congress was
unable to repay its debts.40 Deprived of a permanent military pres-
ence, America was vulnerable to foreign aggression and domestic
insurrection. Unable to bind the states to a common trade policy or
37. See Medhi Hasan, Angela Merkel’s Mania for Austerity is Destroying Europe, NEW
STATESMEN (June 20, 2012), http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/06/angela-
merkels-mania-austerity-destroying-europe [http://perma.cc/5EGC-6M7G] (“Cartoons in the
newspapers of Germany’s neighbours have depicted the chancellor with a Hitler moustache”).
38. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (promoting “energy in the executive” to prevent “feeble execution of the government”).
39. See MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT 8-9, 48 (2003); see also
Keith E. Whittington, Recovering “From the State of Imbecility,” 84 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1578
(2006) (book review) (“The United States needed to build a better war machine, and the U.S.
Constitution was it.”). 
40. See generally EDLING, supra note 39, at 73-76 (discussing shortcomings of the
national government under the Articles of Confederation).
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treaty commitments, the nation had no coherent foreign policy and
no ability to negotiate access to markets for international trade.
The Constitutional Convention’s ambition was to create a central-
ized government powerful enough to fulfill these minimal military
and economic requirements of respectable statehood.41
But the constitutional state-building project ran up against deep
suspicions of centralized state power. The United States had not so
long ago come into being by fighting a revolution against the
oppressive power of a fiscal-military behemoth. The prospect of
recreating “[s]tanding armies, centralized taxing authorities, the
denial of local prerogatives, [and] burgeoning castes of administra-
tors” on American soil did not strike many Americans as an
obviously great idea42—much as resurrecting Germany had not
seemed an obviously great idea to Morgenthau.43
Anti-Federalists fanned these flames of doubt. They were quick
to remind their fellow citizens of “the uniform testimony of history,
and experience of society ... that all governments that have ever
been instituted among men, have degenerated and abused their
power.”44 Anti-Federalists prophesied that the fearsome powers of
a fiscal-military state here at home would inevitably be turned
against its own citizens.45 An expansive federal tax bureaucracy
would appear in “every corner of the city, and country—It will wait
upon the ladies at their toilet[ ], and will not leave them in any of
their domestic concerns.”46
The prospect of a standing army was also alarming. A prominent
feature of “all the monarchies of Europe,” standing armies had
proven themselves a “bane to freedom,” propping up “tyrants, and
their pampered minions.”47 Anti-Federalists believed that the
United States would be no exception. Armed with a professional
military, a dictatorial president or an oligarchical cabal of senators
41. See id. at 73-81.
42. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE 20 (1982).
43. See discussion supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
44. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 152 (1996).
45. SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS 95 (1999).
46. Id.
47. See EDLING, supra note 39, at 44.
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would be able to rule “at the point of the bayonet,” like “Turkish
janizaries enforcing despotic laws.”48
Federalist defenders of the Constitution acknowledged that “in
every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness
involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused,”49 but
they urged their fellow Americans to keep in mind the good side of
state power. If the fiscal and military capabilities of the state
seemed threatening, they were also the “powers by which good
rulers protect the people.”50 Without a large measure of centralized
coercive authority, there could be no national defense, domestic
security, or effective governance of any kind. “If we mean to have
our natural rights and properties protected,” Federalists argued,
“we must first create a power which is able to do it.”51
Standing armies were a perfect example. Publius asked incredu-
lously whether
[w]e must expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign
invaders and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked
and defenseless prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created
by our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that
liberty by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation.52
A state that was not permitted to maintain an established defense
would “exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle, which the world
has yet seen—that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to
prepare for defense before it was actually invaded.”53 Federalists
argued that the Anti-Federalist prescription would be tantamount
to “cut[ting] a man in two in the middle to prevent his hurting
himself.”54
48. See id. at 110.
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 38, at 255-56 (James Madison).
50. EDLING, supra note 39, at 100 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth, Landholder, CONN.
COURANT, Dec. 3, 1787, reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 334, 336 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1983)).
51. Id.
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, supra note 38, at 166 (Alexander Hamilton).
53. Id. at 165.
54. See EDLING, supra note 39, at 93 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth, Speeches in the
Connecticut Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 277-78 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1984)).
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For the Federalists, it was not Americans but European rivals
who should fear “our resources to become powerful and wealthy”
and who “must naturally be inclined to exert every means to
prevent our becoming formidable.”55 In fact, however, the posture
of England and France toward American state-building ambitions
was as much Marshall as Morgenthau. England and France had
long been frustrated by the weakness of an American proto-state
that lacked the centralized power to uphold treaty obligations or
repay debt.56 From their perspective, as well as from that of the
Federalists, a more powerful American state might be a risk worth
taking.
II. THREE APPROACHES TO MANAGING STATE POWER
Confronting the conjoined risks and rewards of state power, we
have several options at our disposal. Again, think of the state as a
powerful technology, like nuclear energy. One strategy is to assert
control over how the technology is used—attempting to ensure that
it will be used for good but not for ill. We might do so by establish-
ing rules about its use (e.g., nuclear fission can be used for energy,
but not for weapons; or for weapons, but only in narrowly pre-
scribed circumstances). Alternatively, or in addition, we might vest
authority over how it will be used in well-motivated or accountable
decision makers (for example, by giving possession of the nuclear
“football” to the President of the United States, while attempting to
prevent untrustworthy decision makers—like the government of
Iran—from developing nuclear capabilities). However, if we have
doubts about the reliability of these mechanisms of control, then we
may resort to banning the technology altogether, or prohibiting its
development (for example, a complete ban on nuclear energy).
Controlling a powerful technology—harnessing its upside rewards
while avoiding its downside risks—is obviously preferable to going
without. But when perfect control is impossible and the risks are
55. See id. at 98 (quoting James Madison from the Virginia Ratifying Convention).
56. See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 932, 955-57 (2010). For their own part, Federalists saw the Constitution as a step
toward recognition and acceptance as a full-fledged member of the Europe-centered society
of states. Id. at 935-36.
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great, the nuclear (or no-nuclear) option of jettisoning the technol-
ogy altogether becomes a live one.
A. Political and Legal Control
The development of state power has gone hand-in-hand with the
development of strategies for controlling it. One method of control
is to vest decision-making authority over how state power will be
used in those who are vulnerable to harm.57 Thus, systems of
representation and electoral democracy are designed to select
decision makers who are likely to put the power of the state to good
uses and to make them accountable to those who will be subject to
that power. Even in the absence of formal institutions of represen-
tation or elections—or in addition to them—informal methods of
political control may be available. Social unrest, threats of revolu-
tion, refusals to cooperate, and other extra-institutional expressions
of public sentiment and sanction can serve the same basic purpose
of making those who wield state power responsive to the interests
of those who are affected by it.
A second method of controlling state power is to subject it to rules
about what it can and cannot be used to accomplish. This is the core
idea of constitutionalism: that state power can be constrained by
legal rules and rights that specify and limit how it may be used.58
If representation and democracy are supposed to control state
power indirectly, by putting it in the right hands, constitutional
rules and rights are supposed to control it directly, by prohibiting
some of its potential uses.
These two methods of state control are conventionally labeled
political and legal—as in, democratic politics and constitutional
law. Couching the distinction in these terms is not strictly accurate
because the rules and institutional frameworks of democracy are
created by constitutional and other forms of law. Nonetheless, the
nomenclature of “legal” versus “political” is an intuitive and
familiar way of marking the functional difference between control-
57. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286 (2012)
(describing this method of control, and contrasting it with rights or substantive prohibitions
on state behavior).
58. In a more expansive sense, constitutionalism is also the idea that states and
governments are constituted by law.
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ling state power by regulating its uses, and controlling state power
by regulating who its users will be and how they will be incentiv-
ized.
Constitutionalism and democracy are sometimes viewed as
working at cross-purposes: constitutional rules and rights place
extrapolitical limitations on democratic decision making, thus
giving rise to the kinds of “countermajoritarian” or anti-democratic
objections that constitutional theorists obsess over. From a simple-
minded functional perspective, however, democratic political
institutions and constitutional rules and rights can be usefully
understood as somewhat interchangeable tools for performing the
same basic job: namely, protecting citizens against the downsides
of state power. Vulnerable groups can be given influence on the
front end over how state power is used; or they can be protected on
the back end by bans on particularly harmful uses.59 But at some
level of abstraction the basic idea is essentially the same: to control
how state power is used in the hope of enjoying its benefits while
minimizing its costs.
Constitutionalism and democracy are features limited to the
domestic state. The mechanisms of control over state power
available to outsiders, operating in the international arena, are
somewhat different. Yet these can also be divided into similar
categories of political and legal.60 The political category encom-
passes the domain of international relations, in which states
attempt to influence one another’s behavior through a variety of
different channels. These include formal institutions of global
governance (for example, the United Nations and the European
Union), bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, threats or the actual
deployment of military force, terrorism, trade relationships and
sanctions, and myriad forms of soft power. The political domain of
international relations blurs into the legal domain of international
law, in which states attempt to control one another’s behavior by
means of treaties, custom, and the decision-making authority of
international tribunals. At the international level, as well as the
domestic, state power is managed, more or less effectively, by some
59. See generally Levinson, supra note 57.
60. Here again, the important conceptual caveat is that many types of “political” control
are underwritten by law.
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combination of (political) influence over users and (legal) regulation
of uses.
B. Incapacitation
Democracy and constitutionalism; representation and rights;
international relations and international law: these are the most
familiar and time-honored techniques for navigating the dilemma
of state power. There is, however, a different approach. Rather than
attempting to control a state whose power is taken for granted, we
might choose to reduce that power, or to prevent it from being
developed in the first place. I will refer to this alternative strategy
as incapacitating the state. The terminology of “incapacitation”
invokes the penal strategy of preventing a dangerous person from
committing future crimes by incarceration, execution, or physical
dismemberment (as in cutting the hands off thieves). The idea here
is roughly the same as applied to the state. Like locking up
recidivist criminals or lopping off their heads or hands, incapacitat-
ing the state is a potentially effective, albeit costly, method of
preventing the state from inflicting future harms.
A bit less metaphorically, the idea of state incapacitation stems
from the concept of state “capacity.” A term of art in development
economics and political science, state capacity means the ability to
accomplish the kinds of things states might be good for: providing
domestic order and protection from violence, raising revenue,
adjudicating disputes, enforcing property rights and contracts,
building transportation and communications networks, providing
health care and education, and so on.61 Put differently, state
61. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, State Capacity, Conflict, and Devel-
opment, 78 ECONOMETRICA 1, 1-2 (2010); Jonathan K. Hanson & Rachel Sigman, Leviathan’s
Latent Dimensions: Measuring State Capacity for Comparative Political Research 1-4 (Aug.
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://perma.cc/QL4E-H4G3. There is a close
relationship, if not complete overlap, between state “capacity” in this sense and what Michael
Mann has termed the “infrastructural” power of the state. See Michael Mann, The
Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results, 25 EUR. J. SOC. 185,
185, 189 (1984).
It is also common to characterize states as “strong” or “weak,” but this vocabulary has
taken on a variety of specific and contradictory meanings. For example, owing to features of
our constitutional design like the separation of powers and federalism, and also to legal and
sociocultural boundaries on the sphere of legitimate government intervention, the United
States is sometimes described a “weak” state. The contrast is to an ideal type of “strong”
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capacity is what state-building is supposed to build. Concretely, this
means assembling the resources and infrastructure that states use
to effectuate capacity and project power: a military or armed police
force; a competent, well-organized bureaucracy; a coherent and
decisive system of lawmaking; a reliable judiciary; and the like.62
State capacity can also be built by making the populations and
territories that states aspire to govern more manageable. Thus,
Tilly describes early modern states as “work[ing] to homogenize
their populations and break down their segmentation by imposing
common languages, religions, currencies, and legal systems, as well
as promoting the construction of connected systems of trade,
transportation, and communication.”63 These efforts at social organ-
ization and rationalization can penetrate down to the fine details of
day-to-day life. For example, the familiar urban grid turns out to be
a powerful and multi-faceted tool of governance that facilitates
“[d]elivering mail, collecting taxes, conducting a census, moving
supplies and people in and out of the city, putting down a riot or
insurrection, digging for pipes and sewer lines, finding a felon or
conscript ... and planning public transportation, water supply, and
trash removal.”64 Modern states have developed ever more effective
tools for monitoring and managing their populations, ranging from
conventions of permanent surnames,65 to elaborate systems of
information collection and management,66 to the extensive data
state, characterized by a centralized, professional bureaucracy and a unified, hierarchical
structure, and based on the Weberian model of modern European nation-states like
absolutist France. But the “weakness” of our domestic governance structure may be in large
part responsible for the economic and military capacity that makes us a global superpower
while extremely “strong” fascist and communist states have fallen by the wayside. See
William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752 (2008).
Likewise, eighteenth-century England, possessed of a “weak” domestic government by the
standards of Continental European absolutism, was the world’s preeminent power. See Ira
Katznelson, Flexible Capacity: The Military and Early American Statebuilding, in SHAPED
BY WAR AND TRADE: INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 82,
85 (Ira Katznelson & Martin Shefter eds., 2002).
62. See Hanson & Sigman, supra note 61, at 3-4.
63. TILLY, supra note 3, at 100. 
64. JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE 57 (1998).
65. See id. at 65 (“Tax and tithe rolls, property rolls, conscription lists, censuses, and
property deeds recognized in law were inconceivable without some means of fixing an
individual’s identity and linking him or her to a kin group.”).
66. See, e.g., JACOB SOLL, THE INFORMATION MASTER: JEAN-BAPTISTE COLBERT’S SECRET
STATE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM (2009) (describing the efforts under the reign of Louis XIV, led
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mining, video surveillance, and DNA databasing operations of the
contemporary “National Surveillance State.”67
Here again, it is important to keep in mind that these tools can
be used for good or for ill. The very same surveillance and intelli-
gence gathering capabilities that can be used to target terrorists
can also be aimed at political dissidents or vulnerable minorities.
Political scientist James C. Scott points to an exquisitely detailed
map produced by the City Office of Statistics of Amsterdam in 1941
entitled “The Distribution of Jews in the Municipality.”68 Tragically,
of course, the map was put to use by the Nazis to round up and
deport the city’s Jewish population.69 Scott reminds us, however,
that the same cartographical capacity “could as easily have been
deployed to feed the Jews as to deport them.”70 Put differently, “[a]n
illegible society ... is a hindrance to any effective intervention by the
state, whether the purpose of that intervention is plunder or public
welfare.”71
Here is the idea of incapacitation: Incapacitating a state simply
means eliminating or withholding some of the tools or resources
that contribute to state capacity—reversing or stunting the process
of state-building. The Morgenthau Plan for post-WWII Germany
and the Articles of Confederation’s limitations on the power of the
national government of the United States offer some vivid exam-
ples: demilitarization, deindustrialization, and denying the power
of coercive taxation are obvious ways of effecting severe reductions
by his chief minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, to strengthen the French monarchy and realize
its absolutist ambitions by creating an elaborate system of information gathering and
management).
67. See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).
68. SCOTT, supra note 64, at 78 (“If one reflects briefly on the kind of detailed information
on names, addresses, and ethnic backgrounds ... and the cartographic exactitude required
to produce this statistical representation, the contribution of legibility to state capacity is
evident.”).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The 1994 Rwandan genocide probably could not have been perpetrated in most
African states, which lack Rwanda’s high level of bureaucratic capacity. See ALISON DES
FORGES, “LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY”: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 8-9, 231-41 (1999)
(describing how the Rwandan government, in order to effect an extermination campaign of
such scope and swiftness, enlisted administrative officials to collect and distribute
information about targets, mobilize citizens for attacks, maintain records of who had been
killed, and dispose of the corpses).
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in state capacity.72 But state power can also be limited in more
incremental and less dramatic ways.
Thus, on the international stage, states routinely take steps to
reduce the military, economic, or internal governance capacity of
their rivals. Patterns of trade, investment, and foreign aid are
structured to hinder the growth of enemies while fostering the
growth of allies. Strategic air strikes, arms embargos, cyberattacks,
and outright wars are designed to reduce the military power of
adversaries. Support for rebel groups or military proxies, economic
sanctions, and propaganda campaigns can serve the purpose of
destabilizing or weakening competitor states. In all of these ways,
states seek not just to influence and control one another’s behavior,
but to reduce the capacity of actual or potential enemies to inflict
harm.
Incapacitation is also an important strategy of domestic state-
craft. One need only think of the disintegration of the Soviet state
or the reforms implemented by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald
Reagan to get a sense of all the ways in which domestic governance
capacity might be rolled back or destroyed. Bureaucratic structures
and administrative capacity can be dismantled. Surveillance and
information-gathering capabilities can be legally or technologically
curtailed. Access to revenues can be impeded or denied (“starving
the beast”). Governmental responsibilities and powers can be
fragmented, making coordinated action more difficult. The size and
scope of the central state can be reduced by reallocating governmen-
tal powers to international or sub-national entities, or by privatiza-
tion.
Some types of incapacitating measures, like those in the
Morgenthau Plan, can be given effect through military force or
physical destruction. Others are effected through law, in particular,
through constitutional law, which will be the focus of much of what
follows. In thinking about incapacitation as a legal strategy, it may
be helpful to clarify how it is different from the mechanisms of legal
control described above. After all, there is a sense in which any
constitutional, or international law, rule or right could be looked
upon as a selective incapacitating measure. We might say, for
instance, that the government is incapacitated from locking up
72. See supra Part I.A-B.
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enemies of the state without any legal process. How, if at all, is this
different from a constitutional regime that denies the government
a standing army, or that impedes the development of the intelli-
gence, administrative, and coercive capabilities necessary to
identify and apprehend enemies of the state in the first place?
The categorical distinction I have in mind tracks similar distinc-
tions in nonconstitutional contexts. For example, antitrust law
distinguishes between “conduct” remedies that mandate or forbid
discrete behaviors (like an order not to raise prices or discriminate
against a rival) and “structural” remedies that might go so far as to
break up a large company like AT&T or Microsoft into pieces.73
Similarly, financial regulators concerned about the systemic risks
created by banks that are “too big to fail” might impose rules and
requirements along the lines of Dodd-Frank, or they might
eliminate systemic risk by, as some have proposed, breaking up the
banks into entities small enough to safely fail.74 Gun violence can
be prevented by the enforcement of criminal laws against murder,
or by outright bans on gun possession. Sexual violence or terrorist
attacks can be prevented by policing and punishing bad acts, or by
preemptively detaining suspected sex offenders or terrorists.
The paired regulatory strategies in each of these contexts can be
distinguished along two related dimensions. One is between
regulation targeting behavior that is immediately harmful and
regulation targeting behavior or arrangements that have the
potential to cause harm some distance downstream. The latter kind
of regulation is sometimes described as “preventative” or “prophylac-
tic.”75 Unlike regulation that is directly targeted at harm, preventa-
tive and prophylactic regulation prohibits some measure of
harmless and even beneficial conduct. The banks and their
73. William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis 21, 29-30 (May 7, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://perma.cc/Z546-MARC.
74. See, e.g., Jeff Kearns & Jesse Hamilton, Fed’s Fisher Urges Bank Breakup Amid Too-
Big-to-Fail ‘Injustice,’ BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2013, 3:33 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-06-25/fed-s-fisher-urges-bank-breakup-amid-too-big-to-fail-injustice-.html
[http://perma.cc/3V69-3DQA].
75. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS (2006);
David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988); cf.
Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172 (2010) (distinguishing between
regulation targeted directly at preventing harm and regulation designed to decrease the
likelihood of harm by shifting the relative power of injurers and victims).
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customers are deprived of economies of scale and coordination;
innocent people who would never engage in terrorist attacks lose
their liberty.
Legal incapacitation of the state is similarly prophylactic and
preventative.76 Like breaking up banks or locking up potential
terrorists, incapacitating measures deprive states of capacities that
are potentially beneficial in order to preempt potential downstream
harms. Depriving a state of a standing army is, as the Federalists
were at pains to point out, a rather blunderbuss approach to harm-
prevention that entails substantial spillover costs.77
A second distinguishing characteristic shared by incapacitation
and prophylactic and preventative regulation, generally, is greater
reliability in ensuring that harms do not come to pass, as compared
to more surgical alternatives. This is what arguably justifies the
substantial spillover costs of these measures. If we were confident
that antitrust conduct rules, Dodd-Frank regulatory rules, criminal
prohibitions on homicide or terrorism, and the like, would be
perfectly effective in preventing the prohibited conduct, there would
76. Compare Adrian Vermeule’s notion of “precautionary constitutionalism” as an
approach to dealing with “political risks.” ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK 2,
10 (2014). Vermeule defines precautionary constitutionalism as the view that:
[C]onstitutional rules should above all entrench precautions against the risks
that official action will result in dictatorship or tyranny, corruption and official
self-dealing, violations of the rights of minorities, or other political harms of
equivalent severity. On this view, constitutional rulemakers and citizens design
and manage political institutions with a view to warding off the worst case. The
burden of uncertainty is to be set against official power, out of a suspicion that
the capacity and tendency of official power to inflict cruelty, indignity, and other
harms are greater than its capacity and tendency to promote human welfare,
liberty, or justice.
Id. at 11. Vermeule’s project is largely directed at criticizing the irrational risk-aversion that
is built into this definition, much as proponents of cost-benefit analysis have criticized the
irrational risk-aversion of the “precautionary principle” in environmental law and other
regulatory settings. See id. at 11 & n.16. There is nothing necessarily irrational or risk-
averse about state incapacitation as the concept is framed here, however. Nonetheless,
Vermeule’s perspective calls attention to a similar set of variables in assessing the utility of
prophylactically limiting state power.
77. Of course, some degree of prophylactic over-inclusivity is also a feature of many run
of the mill regulatory rules. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 889-904 (1999); Strauss, supra note 75. In fact, any
constitutional rule, as compared to a standard, is, by definition, somewhat over-inclusive
relative to purpose. That said, there is a significant difference of degree between, say,
imposing disclosure requirements and dissolving Goldman Sachs; or between the Third
Amendment and an across-the-board prohibition on a standing army.
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be no need to suffer the spillover costs of their prophylactic
alternatives. In reality, however, we know that enforcement and
compliance are often highly imperfect. Structural forms of incapaci-
tation, like breaking up banks and locking up criminals, are
supposed to create more reliable impediments to harm than bare
legal prohibitions. The competitive market forces and transaction
costs that raise the expense of collusion across firm boundaries, or
the cell bars that raise the costs of committing a crime or an act of
terrorism, are meant to create “physical” barriers more difficult to
breach than legal rules backed by (more or less credible) threats of
sanctions.78
State incapacitating measures likewise rely upon structural
disabilities that are more difficult to evade or ignore than free-
floating legal prohibitions.79 This is the logic behind the Anti-
Federalists’ objections to the constitutional permissibility of
standing armies. Compared to the alternative of permitting a
permanent military force, but legally regulating its use, complete
prohibition, while costly, might also be more reliable. The obvious
concern is that once a tyrannical president gets his hands on an
army he might not be long detained by the “parchment barriers” of
ordinary constitutional rules and rights.80
Of course, a tyrannical president might also ignore a constitu-
tional prohibition on raising a peacetime army in the first place. As
it happens, the first derogatory reference to “parchment barriers”
in the Federalist Papers comes from Alexander Hamilton, precisely
78. Cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006) (defining a similar category of
regulation by “architecture” or “code” in cyberspace); Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and
the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 657 (2006) (distinguishing
regulation by “structural laws,” which create physical constraints on behavior, from
“regulati[on] by statutory commands alone”).
79. Structural or physical barriers are not always more effective impediments to
wrongdoing than ordinary legal prohibitions. Compare two ways of preventing speeding:
legally enforced speed limits versus the installation of physical speed bumps in the road; or
two ways of preventing trespassing: legally enforced prohibition versus building a fence.
Which is more effective will depend on the likelihood and severity of legal penalties, on the
one hand, and the design of the speed bumps and fence on the other. Low fences or speed
bumps might well be less effective barriers than frequent police patrols and severe penalties
for trespassing or speeding.
80. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 658, 662 (2011) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note
38, at 305 (James Madison)).
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in reference to constitutional prohibitions on standing armies
during peacetime.81 Hamilton cites the example of Pennsylvania,
which, despite a constitutional declaration that standing armies are
“dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace,”
apparently could not resist the temptation to raise an army “in a
time of profound peace” when confronted with “partial disorders in
one or two of her counties.”82 The moral, for Hamilton, is that
constitutional “rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to
run counter to the necessities of society” will not be effective.83 
Certainly Hamilton was right to observe that any legal obstacle
can be overcome if there is sufficient political or social will. But
some obstacles are more effective impediments than others. Raising
an army from scratch is likely to be more difficult than violating a
rule against using an existing army in some abusive way. Building
an army requires time and resources. People will see it happening
and have opportunities to sound the alarm and mobilize resistance.
It is at least plausible that a constitutional ban on standing armies
would erect a much stiffer kind of parchment barrier than regula-
tory rules governing such an army’s use.
To summarize, two features distinguish what I am terming
incapacitation from ordinary legal regulation: a broadly prophylac-
tic approach to limiting state power, and the imposition of struc-
tural barriers that are more difficult to override or reverse than
typical rules and rights. The relative costs and benefits of incapaci-
tation follow straightforwardly from these distinctive features. The
main advantage of incapacitation is that it promises greater efficacy
and reliability in limiting the downside costs of state power.84 The
main disadvantage of incapacitation is the often considerable cost
of losing the potential upside gains of state power.
C. Control and Capacity as Complements
In an ideal world, we would exercise perfect control over unlim-
ited state power—enjoying all its benefits while avoiding all its
81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, supra note 38, at 167 (Alexander Hamilton).
82. Id. at 166.
83. Id. at 167.
84. The comparison here will ultimately be not just to ordinary constitutional regulatory
rules, but also to political controls.
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costs. It is only when control becomes imperfect, and state power
consequently comes with downside risks, that the possibility of
unbuilding, or incapacitating the state, emerges as a plausible,
second-best alternative. Put the other way around, the more
confidence we have in our ability to control the state, the more state
capacity we will be willing to countenance.
This complementary relationship between control and capacity
has been at the center of historical processes of state-building.
Rulers of nascent states who wanted to build capacity by extracting
tax revenues and soldiers often met with resistance from unenthu-
siastic populations. Forced to strike a bargain, rulers found that the
purchase price of cooperation was greater popular control over state
power, institutionalized through some combination of political
accountability and rights.85 Thus, in thirteenth-century England,
bargaining between the Crown and local elites resulted in the
Magna Carta, as well as the council of barons that evolved into the
first Parliament.86 In the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
redoubled efforts by the Tudors, and then the Stuarts, to expand
the power and wealth of the central state led to Parliamentary
pushback, and eventually to civil war and the Glorious Revolution
of 1688.87 With royal absolutism defeated, England moved forward
with what is often described as a system of “limited government,”
featuring a Bill of Rights, politically independent courts, and an
invigorated role for Parliament—once again, rights and representa-
tion.88
But limited government did not mean limited state capacity.
Quite the opposite—with legal and political controls over state
power more securely in place, popular and Parliamentary resistance
to centralized state-building diminished and the English state
proceeded to expand.89 Tax revenues and state expenditures soared.
85. See TILLY, supra note 3, at 102-03; see also Lisa Blaydes & Eric Chaney, The Feudal
Revolution and Europe’s Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim
World Before 1500 CE, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 16, 16-17 (2013). 
86. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL 185 (2012).
87. Id. at 186-90.
88. See id. at 185-97; JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY, AND THE
ENGLISH STATE, 1688-1783 (1988).
89.  See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 86, at 196 (“Parliament had opposed making
the state more effective and better resourced prior to 1688 because it could not control it.
After 1688 it was a different story.”); see also Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast,
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Unprecedented military might was mobilized for war against
France.90 An elaborate, professionalized bureaucracy was assem-
bled, “[with] such a multitude of new officers, created by and
removable at the royal pleasure, that they have extended the
influence of government to every corner of the nation.”91 In sum,
post-revolution England became a
“consensually strong state” in the sense that the state ...
[became] stronger with the consent of citizens; citizens (or in the
British case, the merchants, gentry and some aristocrats) gave
this consent precisely because they knew that they could rein in
the power of the state if it deviated significantly from the course
of action that they wanted to see implemented.92
The Marshall versus Morgenthau debate turned in large part on
the same logic.93 The risks and rewards of rebuilding the power of
the German state would obviously depend on the prospects of
controlling Germany’s political direction and allegiances. The
gamble of the Marshall Plan was that Germany could be brought
into the fold of an economically interconnected Western Europe
allied with the United States against Communism.94 Viewed in this
light, the Marshall Plan was of a piece with the creation of NATO
in 1949 and the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951—a
first step toward the eventual formation of the European Union.95
From the close of World War II through the contemporary European
Union, hopes for a lasting European peace have been focused on the
economic, political, legal, and cultural integration—and thus
control—of an enduringly powerful German state.96 Looking back
on the fears of Morgenthau and Thatcher, the project of controlling
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in
Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 817 (1989) (“[I]n exchange for the
greater say in government, parliamentary interests agreed to put the government on a sound
financial footing ... [by] provid[ing] sufficient tax revenue.”).
90. North & Weingast, supra note 89, at 817.
91. See EDLING, supra note 39, at 64 (quoting Blackstone).
92. Daron Acemoglu, Institutions, Factor Prices, and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States?,
100 AM. ECON. REV. 115, 118 (2010). 
93. See supra Part I.A.
94. See MCALLISTER, supra note 26, at 123.
95. See HOGAN, supra note 35, at 376, 378; Hitchcock, supra note 17, at 169.
96. See HOGAN, supra note 35, at 378.
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Germany can be counted as a great success. Like England after the
Glorious Revolution, Germany is now a “consensually strong” state
from the perspective of the United States and its European allies.97
Much of the debate between Federalists and Anti-Federalists
over the United States Constitution likewise turned on predictive
judgments about how effectively a powerful, central state could be
politically and legally controlled by its citizenry.98 For all of their
rhetoric about the inherently dangerous qualities of government
power, Anti-Federalists had no objection to powerful governments
at the state level.99 In contrast to the federal government, state gov-
ernments were considered trustworthy recipients of power because
they were responsive and accountable to the interests of their
citizens.100 In other words, state governments could be “consen-
sually strong,” or as the Federal Farmer put it, “strong and well
guarded.”101 The national government, however, would be much less
well-guarded. In the Anti-Federalist imagination, it would be run
by a group of distant and despotic aristocrats completely discon-
nected from “the body of the people.”102 This presumptive failure of
political control led the Anti-Federalists to embrace the two
97. The same is true of the other great power defeated by the United States and its allies
in World War II. Under General MacArthur’s command, occupied Japan was reconstructed
pursuant to an agenda of “demilitarization and democratization.” See JOHN W. DOWER,
EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 73 (1999). The demilitarization
prong was an incapacitation measure; the democratization prong was about control. Id. at
82-83. Occupation authorities mounted a multi-faceted campaign to turn Japan into a
peaceful, democratic, and law-abiding country—to “insure that Japan will not again become
a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world” and “[t]o bring about
the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will ... support
the objectives of the United States.” Id. at 76-77 (quoting the United States’s Initial
Postsurrender Policy for Japan). This would require “remaking the political, social, cultural,
and economic fabric of a defeated nation, and in the process changing the very way of
thinking of its populace.” Id. at 78. Toward that end, the Japanese government was forced
to extend the franchise to women, prohibit former military officers from holding public office,
promote labor unionization, reform its educational system, break up monopolies, implement
agrarian land reform, decentralize the police force, and enact a constitution premised on
popular sovereignty and liberal rights. See id. at 80-84.
98. See supra Part I.B.
99. See CORNELL, supra note 45, at 72-73, 85, 90.
100. See EDLING, supra note 39, at 181-82.
101. See id. at 182 (quoting Federal Farmer, An Additional Number of Letters to the
Republican, in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
356 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1995)).
102. See RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 229-30.
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predictable alternatives. First, they advocated for more stringent
legal controls that could be created through a constitutional bill of
rights.103 Second, they preached incapacitation: limiting the oppres-
sive power that the Federalists’ Constitution proposed to grant.104
Opposed to both of these possibilities, Federalists made the case
that democratic political control would suffice. Ridiculing the Anti-
Federalist vision of “Congress as some foreign body, as a set of men
who will seek every opportunity to enslave us,”105 Federalists
insisted that “[t]he federal representatives will represent the people;
they will be the people”; their “interest is inseparably connected
with our own.”106 Federalists argued that if democracy worked as
planned, there would be much less reason to worry about state
power or to resist its expansion.107
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STATE-BUILDING AND STATE-UNBUILDING
A common but perplexing observation is that constitutions both
build and constrain state power. The preceding discussion of state-
building, control, and incapacitation may help to shed some light on
how these dual, and apparently dueling, ambitions of consti-
tutionalism can be made to fit together. Three points in particular
are broadly applicable to constitutional design and development.
The first is the complementary relationship between building and
103. Actually, the Bill of Rights as originally conceived and, in part, enacted was as much
about bolstering popular political control as it was about protecting discretely enumerated
rights. Many of the rights it enumerated were meant to empower majoritarian governance
by placing limits on the self-serving behavior of federal officials and by safeguarding
institutions of state and local self-government to insulate citizens from these officials’
despotic reach. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION,
at xii-xiii, 3-133 (1998).
104. As a specific example, the Constitution’s two year sunset rule for military
appropriations was designed to give Congress control over the existence and scope of a
standing army. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. Had Anti-Federalists been convinced that
Congress would be responsive to popular political will, this control mechanism might have
sufficed. 
105. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 545
(1969).
106. Id.
107. In fact, the Federalists’ primary concern with democratic accountability was that it
would work too well—that legislators would be too responsive to their constituents, allowing
factions to seize control of government and substituting a debased kind of populism for high-
minded deliberation about the public good. See RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 203-43.
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constraining state power: the more power is built, the more the
demand for constraints; and the more state power can be con-
strained, the more it will be welcome.108 Recall the idea of a
“consensually strong” state.109 Following from this idea, the second
point is that constraints on state power can take different forms.
One way to constrain state power is to control it. This can be
accomplished by creating a political framework that makes those
with their hands on the levers of power democratically accountable
or otherwise responsive to the interests of those who do not. It can
also be accomplished by imposing regulatory rules and rights that
place preconceived limits on what state power can be used to
accomplish. Finally, it is important to recognize that constraints on
state power need not be external to the constitutive, state-building
function. The conventional, Hobbesian-Lockeian understanding of
constitutionally “limited” government portrays an omnipotent
Leviathan whose behavior is regulated by specific limitations on
how its power can be exercised. But another approach to limiting
government is to make the Leviathan less potent—to reduce state
power rather than building and binding it. State incapacitation
should be placed alongside rights and representation as one of the
basic tools of constitutional design.
The discussion that follows brings these ideas to bear on some of
the central features of U.S. constitutional design: the legislative-
executive separation of powers, the presidency, and federalism.
These and other aspects of the “structural” constitution are sup-
posed to provide the basic building blocks of national state power.
At the same time, however, the structural constitution is supposed
to control the power of the national state by creating an elaborate
system of democratic politics. The structural constitution is also
supposed to limit state power in crucial respects. These simulta-
neous state-building, state-controlling, and state-incapacitating
ambitions have competed and, somewhat awkwardly, co-existed in
the design of the American Constitution since the Founding.
Viewing the Constitution through the lens of building, controlling,
108. This is an example of the more general observation that constitutional constraints
can be “enabling,” increasing state power in a broader frame of reference. See STEPHEN
HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 6-8 (1995).
109. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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and unbuilding state power illuminates some recurring patterns in
how we think about constitutional law, development, and design.110
A. Separation of Powers as Straightjacket
The Madisonian design of our system of constitutionally sepa-
rated powers and checks and balances has long been celebrated by
Americans as a work of political genius, credited with at least three
major virtues. First, by assigning qualitatively different governance
tasks to specialized institutions, the constitutional design is
supposed to leverage the efficiency benefits of specialization and
division of labor.111 Separation of powers is supposed to increase the
capacity of the national state in much the same way as Henry
Ford’s assembly line increased the capacity of automobile produc-
tion. Furthermore, along the lines laid out in Madison’s famous
Federalist 10,112 dividing powers is supposed to be conducive to a
system of political pluralism, preventing a unified majority coalition
(or “faction”) from monopolizing control over the government and
ensuring that multiple and minority interests are represented.113 In
other words, separation of powers is supposed to facilitate broad-
based political control over how the enhanced power of the national
state is deployed.
At the same time, however, the most straightforward functional
feature of separation of powers is its tendency to “preserve liberty
by disabling government.”114 By requiring the concerted action of
110. In discussing constitutional structure, it is obviously important to distinguish
assessments of the power or capacity of a particular institutions of domestic governance from
broader assessments of the power or capacity of the United States. Limits on the capacity of
the President, for instance, may channel power to Congress or to state governments, with
ambiguous effects on the power of the United States as a whole. 
111. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 64 (2005);
HOLMES, supra note 108, at 165.
112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 38, at 52, 54 (James Madison).
113. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 111, at 64 (“Different branches chosen at different times
through different voting rules might together produce a more accurate and more stable
composite sketch of deliberate public opinion.”).
114. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 15-16 (1993); see also, e.g., Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 193 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The doctrine of the
separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but
to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”). As Sunstein elaborates, “The system of checks
and balances enabled the sovereign people to pursue a strategy of ‘divide and conquer.’”
SUNSTEIN, supra, at 16.
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multiple institutions with often conflicting interests, the separation
of powers multiplies veto points and raises the transaction costs of
state action. This is the opposite of efficiency; it is a hard-wired
inefficiency, designed to make it more difficult for the state to
interfere with liberty—or to do anything else. This is why progres-
sives and other proponents of vigorous government have long
heaped scorn on the constitutional design for creating a government
“divided against itself” and thus “deliberately and effectively
weakened.”115 In recent years, the combination of polarized political
parties and divided party control of government has exacerbated
these structural tendencies.116 The inefficiency and gridlock of
divided government in Washington is now more than ever a source
of frustration for those who seek governmental solutions to pressing
social problems.
Whether gridlocked government is a price worth paying for the
preservation of (negative) liberty will depend on competing
assessments of what an unfettered national state might use its
power to accomplish. These assessments, in turn, will depend on
how effectively we think we can control its behavior through some
combination of law and politics. The incapacitating features of the
separation of powers were originally conceived as a fail-safe to
guard against the possibility that political control would break
down entirely. As Madison explained, the “primary control on the
government” would be its “dependence on the people” through a
system of democratic politics.117 In the event that democratic
accountability failed, however, the separation of powers would serve
as a second line of defense against federal tyranny—an “auxilliary
precaution[ ].”118 So even if the Anti-Federalists’ worst fears were
realized and each department of the national government became
captured by corrupt and power-hungry officials, the separation of
powers would pit rivalrous branches and chambers against one
another in a stalemated competition for control over the govern-
ment. This is the celebrated idea of “[a]mbition ... counteract[ing]
115. Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (2012) (book
review) (quoting HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 40 (1915)).
116. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006).
117. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 38, at 322 (James Madison).
118. Id.
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ambition,”119 conceived by Madison as a means of effectively
incapacitating a corrupted national state running free of democratic
control.
Moreover, Madison and other Federalists insisted that the
structure of separation of powers would be a much more reliable
safeguard than the Anti-Federalists’ beloved bill of rights. Attempt-
ing to impose legal controls on state power under these circum-
stances would be an exercise in futility because officials with
despotic designs would simply ignore or override any “parchment
barriers” that stood in their way.120 As Roger Sherman bluntly put
the point, “No bill of rights ever yet bound the supreme power
longer than the honeymoon of a new married couple, unless the
rulers were interested in preserving the rights.”121 The constitu-
tional separation of powers, in contrast, would be effectively self-
enforcing, converting the self-interested ambitions of rulers into
“personal motives to resist the encroachments of the others.”122
Even if legal and political controls on national state power both
failed, the system of separated powers would limit its capacity to do
harm.123
This was the Founders’ case for separation of powers as a system
of state incapacitation. From the perspective of the present, it may
be worth noting that the prospects for effective legal and political
control of the national government now look somewhat more
optimistic than they did to Madison and his compatriots. Democ-
racy in this country has more or less succeeded. It is now harder to
imagine government officials setting themselves up as monarchs or
oligarchs and letting loose a reign of tyranny over the citizenry.
What is more, legal controls over the national government also seem
to have worked better than Madison would have anticipated. We
now have a fairly robust regime of constitutional rights and other
limitations on the power of the national government, undergirded
by a long history of independent judicial review. Even as we have
119. Id.
120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 38, at 308 (James Madison).
121. Roger Sherman, A Countryman, II., NEW HAVEN GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1787.
122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 38, at 321-22 (James Madison).
123. Whether the separation of powers and other structural features of the constitutional
design have, in fact, proven more reliable or enduring than rights protections, or precisely
why they should be expected to, is not entirely clear. See Levinson, supra note 80, at 697-705.
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consolidated political and legal control over the national state,
however, the day-to-day operation of separation of powers, reinvigo-
rated by party competition, has tightened its incapacitating grip.124
To be sure, the American system of separation of powers can be
defended, as well as criticized, on other grounds.125 As compared to
a unified system of parliamentary governance based on the West-
minster model, the American system’s constitutional structure
continues to claim advantages relating to both democratic account-
ability and efficiency.126 With respect to the former, although the
separation of powers tends to diffuse responsibility among branches
and chambers and in that respect hinders accountability,127 it also
may facilitate greater deliberation, moderation, and broad-based
interest representation than parliamentary government.128 In this
regard, the original Madisonian imperative of preventing a
momentary majority from taking complete control of government
continues to play an arguably salutary role in the American system
of government. The extreme gridlock induced by divided govern-
ment might be viewed as an inevitable, or even desirable, byproduct
of the kind of pluralist and minority representation that the
separation of powers facilitates.129 As for efficiency, while the
pervasive comingling of powers in the administrative state has
undermined the assembly line analogy, proponents of the American
system now emphasize the unrivaled efficacy of presidential
power.130 Indeed, as discussed below, by creating legislative-
executive gridlock, the separation of powers has encouraged
Presidents to claim unilateral authority to meet pressing demands
for national state power, giving rise to the “imperial” presidency.
There is much more to be said about the costs and benefits of the
separation of powers along these and other dimensions. For present
124. More precisely, the grip has tightened and released depending in large part on
whether the branches and chambers of the national government are divided or unified by
political party. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 116, at 2338-47. 
125. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633
(2000) (discussing criticisms of the American system of separation of powers and surveying
the political science literature on presidential versus parliamentary governments).
126. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 116, at 2338-39, 2343-44.
127. Id. at 2326.
128. See id. at 2328.
129. See id. at 2339.
130. See id. at 2338-39.
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purposes, however, it may be enough to observe that the Madison-
ian case for separation of powers as a mechanism for intentionally
disabling, or incapacitating, the national state seems increasingly
difficult to reconstruct in the modern world.
B. The Imperial (yet Plebiscitary) Presidency
Since the Founding, the presidency has been the focus of our
greatest hopes for national state power and also our greatest fears.
The Hamiltonian hope is that the presidency will be a source of
“energy” in government and leadership on the world stage.131 Many
progressives and contemporary proponents of activist government
have likewise seen “the dominating, energetic leadership of a
commanding President” as the only hope for turning the fragmented
and enervated American government into “an instrument of
effective power.”132 During the second Bush Administration, Vice
President Richard Cheney made much the same argument in
defense of unfettered executive power.133 The fear, of course, is that
the presidency will become, in the words of Edmund Randolph, “a
foetus of monarchy.”134 In the view of many civil libertarians, the
Bush Administration’s war on terrorism took the office dangerously
far in that direction.135
These hopes and fears have been amplified in the modern era of
the so-called “imperial” presidency.136 Over the course of the
twentieth century, with the emergence of the United States as a
global superpower and the rise of the domestic regulatory state, the
131. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 38, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Energy in
the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.”).
132. Pildes, supra note 115, at 1383.
133. See id. at 1396.
134. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 66 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
135. From this perspective, the experience of other presidential systems presents a
cautionary tale. In many countries in the world, including all thirty of the Latin American
presidential systems at various times, frustration with gridlocked government has led, at
some point, to presidents seizing dictatorial powers, setting themselves up as caudillos and
ruling by decree. See Ackerman, supra note 125, at 646; Juan J. Linz, Presidential or
Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in 1 THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL
DEMOCRACY 3, 43 (Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1994).
136. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (Mariner Books 2004)
(1973).
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executive branch has ballooned in size and strength.137 Presidents
of both parties now stake claims to nearly exclusive authority over
foreign affairs and broad latitude for unilateral action in the
domestic realm as well.138 They have at their disposal a massive
bureaucracy that is increasingly politicized and centrally controlled
from the White House; not to mention the most powerful military
in the world.
For modern-day Hamiltonians, the growth of the imperial
presidency is cause for celebration. For example, in a recent book
entitled The Executive Unbound, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule
applaud modern presidents for seizing nearly complete hold over
the power and direction of the national state, and for casting off
antiquated constraints like constitutional limitations and the
separation of powers.139 This laudatory perspective on presidential
power reflects two predictable premises. The first is that the upside
benefits of presidential power are high enough to warrant any
downside risk. For Posner and Vermeule, “the complexity of policy
problems, ... the need for secrecy in many matters of security and
foreign affairs, and the sheer speed of policy response necessary in
crises” threaten social welfare and create governance challenges
that only the executive branch is equipped to solve.140
The second premise is that the downside risk of presidential
power is mitigated by effective mechanisms of control. As it
happens, another common characterization of the modern presi-
dency, besides imperial, is “plebiscitary”—meaning that Presidents
are directly democratically accountable to the American people and
continuously responsive to public opinion and popular demands.141
Posner and Vermeule argue that the plebiscitary accountability of
137. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4 (2010).
138. Id.
139. Id. (describing the modern presidency as having entered “an age after the separation
of powers” and the “legally constrained executive” as “a historical curiosity”).
140. Id. at 9.
141. See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT, at xi (1985); Matthew D. Adler,
Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 875-76 (1997); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 2245, 2335 (2001). “Plebiscitary” is sometimes used in a different and nearly opposite
sense to mean accountable only at election time but unaccountable to Congress, the press,
or the public while actually governing. This was how Schlesinger used the term in The
Imperial Presidency. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 136, at 255.
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the presidency makes a mockery of the kind of “tyrannophobia”
expressed by Edmund Randolph and civil libertarian critics of the
Bush Administration.142 Tyrants and dictators do not spend their
time obsessing over reelection prospects and approval ratings. For
Posner and Vermeule, the combination of democratic elections and
the president’s ongoing need to maintain political support and
public credibility should be sufficient to keep executive power
harnessed to the public interest.143
Tyrannophobes might find it more reassuring if Presidents were
effectively controlled not just by politics but also by law. Posner and
Vermeule categorically deny the efficacy of legal controls,144 but in
another recent book about the presidency, Jack Goldsmith points to
a robust array of legal as well as political constraints that bind
modern Presidents.145 Goldsmith’s argument is that the enormous
power of the post-9/11 presidency has provoked the suspicious
attention of courts, Congress, journalists, human rights advocates,
and lawyers who monitor, publicize, and check the President’s every
move.146 According to Goldsmith, this “synoptic” network of “watch-
ers” keeps the President accountable to the rule of law as well as to
the American people, legitimating and further strengthening execu-
tive power.147 Here again, capacity and control—or in the book’s
synonymous title, Power and Constraint—are complements.148 So
142. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 137, at 176.
143. See id. at 204-05.
144. See id. at 205.
145. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
9/11, at 207-11 (2012).
146. Id. at xi-xiii.
147. Id. at xv.
148. Stephen Skowronek sees a similar pattern in the broad sweep of American political
development with respect to the presidency. In Skowronek’s view, throughout American
history, each major expansion of presidential power has been accompanied by a
corresponding effort to increase democratic accountability and control. Starting as early as
the Jeffersonians and then Jacksonians, and extending through the Progressives and New
Dealers, new claims of executive authority and increases in executive power have been
coupled with new mechanisms for linking the presidency to the public will—whether popular
mobilization, political parties, pursuit of the public interest, or interest group pluralism. See
Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental
Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070 (2009); see also Jerry L.
Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115
YALE L.J. 1256 (2006). Mashaw describes a “three-step process of building and binding
administrative capacity”:
First, something happens in the world. Second, public policymakers identify
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long as the imperial presidency is also a plebiscitary or synoptic
one, we have nothing to fear.
Those who do see something to fear in presidential power have
correspondingly less faith in the efficacy of political and legal
controls. In yet another recent book about the modern presidency,
Bruce Ackerman warns of the impending Decline and Fall of the
American Republic at the hands of a “runaway presidency.”149 As
the image of a runaway presidency suggests, Ackerman believes
that both political and legal controls over the presidency are in the
process of breaking down, paving the way for a de facto dictator-
ship.150 Ackerman argues that democratic accountability is being
undermined by the decline of party elites and the professional press
as gatekeepers, clearing a path to the presidency for extremist
demagogues who will be responsive only to a small segment of the
electorate on the far right or left.151 To make matters worse,
Presidents have become adept at using the media to manipulate
public opinion, creating a “politics of unreason” that further
undermines meaningful democratic decision making.152 Ackerman
further predicts that the rule of law will fall into a legal black hole
as Presidents increasingly follow the lead of the Bush Administra-
tion by claiming a popular mandate to ignore congressional statutes
while relying on “elite lawyers in the executive branch to ... vindi-
cate the constitutionality of their most blatant power grabs.”153
that happening as a problem, or an opportunity, and initiate new forms of
governmental action to take advantage of or to remedy the new situation.
Third, these new forms of action generate anxieties about the direction and
control of public power. Means are thus sought to make the new initiative ...
accountable to law.
Id. at 1337. As Mashaw’s examples make clear, accountability to “law” encompasses not just
legal but also political controls over the bureaucracy. From this perspective, judicial review
of administrative action is of a piece with political control strategies such as congressional
oversight and specificity in delegation, the Administrative Procedure Act, interest
representation in administrative policymaking, and the centralization of regulatory
policymaking in the Office of Management and Budget. All have been efforts to ensure that
burgeoning executive authority is adequately controlled, whether through the oversight of
politically accountable actors or legal limitations.
149. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 6 (2010).
150. Id. at 3-4.
151. Id. at 9.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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The constructive ambition of Ackerman’s project is in part to
reinvigorate legal and political controls on the presidency. Thus,
Ackerman proposes a package of reforms aimed at “enlightening
politics” and “restoring the rule of law.”154 But Ackerman wants to
go further than this: he wants not just to control the imperial
presidency, but to disempower it, up to and including, eliminating
the presidency altogether and switching to a modified parliamen-
tary system of government.155 Short of that, Ackerman suggests
cutting the imperial presidency down to size, whether by cabining
the executive’s authority to initiate military action,156 or by
fragmenting the unitary and hierarchical structure that makes the
executive such an efficient organ of governance.157 For Ackerman
and others who worry about out-of-control Presidents and the grave
risks of executive power in the wrong hands, incapacitation is a
logical pathway to pursue.
Logical, but costly: Even Ackerman’s overwhelmingly pessimistic
view of presidential power is tempered at times by his recognition
that proponents of “activist government—dedicated to the ongoing
pursuit of economic welfare, social justice, and environmental
integrity”—have good reason to embrace executive efficacy.158
Ackerman thus describes the decision to sacrifice presidential
power as a “tragic choice[ ].”159 The original critic of the imperial
presidency, Arthur Schlesinger, struggled with the same dilemma.
Having warned of a “conception of presidential power so spacious
and peremptory as to imply a radical transformation of the
traditional polity,”160 Schlesinger still could not bring himself to
advocate divesting the presidency of its imperial power.161 He was
154. Id. at 119-40, 141-79.
155. See Ackerman, supra note 125, at 727-28. 
156. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 149, at 165-74 (proposing a framework statute
requiring congressional approval of presidential emergency powers).
157. See id. at 152-59 (proposing that Senate confirmation be required for all important
White House staffers, preventing the President from surrounding himself with “superloyal-
ists” who will work in a coordinated way to do his bidding); see also Neal Kumar Katyal,
Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115
YALE L.J. 2322, 2335-42 (2006) (describing mechanisms that could be used to create checks
and balances within the executive branch in order to constrain presidential power).
158. ACKERMAN, supra note 149, at 124.
159. Id.
160. SCHLESINGER, supra note 136, at xxvi.
161. After considering a suite of reforms to curtail presidential power, Schlesinger backed
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painfully aware that a President powerful enough to fight the
Vietnam War could also fight a war on poverty; that for every Nixon
there would be an FDR or a Kennedy. Rather than relinquish the
irreplaceable power of the presidency, Schlesinger wanted to pursue
the ideal of full-blooded executive power brought more fully under
political and legal control.162 As he put it, we should preserve “a
strong Presidency within the Constitution,” and seek a “means of
reconciling a strong and purposeful Presidency with equally strong
and purposeful forms of democratic control.”163 For Schlesinger, as
for many others, the power of the presidency is a lot to give up, even
if it is also a lot to fear.
C. Federalism: Incapacitation by Substitution
Like the separation of powers, the American system of constitu-
tional federalism has long been celebrated as a safeguard against
the dangers of centralized state power. As courts and commentators
frequently remind us, “the principal benefit of the federalist system
is a check on abuses of government power,” one that “ensure[s] the
protection of ‘our fundamental liberties.’”164 Precisely what this
means, however, is seldom made clear.
In fact, there are at least three ways in which federalism might
protect us from the power of the central state. First, federalism
allows groups to effectively exit the domain of national power and
govern themselves independently. By turning over policy making
authority in some areas to the states, the federal system allows
away with the worry that the “scheme of presidential subordination could easily be pressed
to the point of national folly.” Id. at 405.
162. Id. at xxviii.
163. Id.; see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 145, at xvi (quoting this language and
emphasizing that this was Schlesinger’s bottom-line).
164. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)); see also MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN,
FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 55 (2008) (“Proponents of
federalism often argue that federalism protects liberty, generally by diffusing government
power.”); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of
Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 380 (“Perhaps the most frequently
mentioned function of the federal system is the one it shares ... with the [system of]
separation of powers, namely, the protection of the citizen against governmental
oppression—the ‘tyranny’ that the Framers were so concerned about.”).
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groups that would be losing minorities at the national level to
become self-governing majorities at the state level.
However, federalism is not just about exit; it is also about voice.
Federalism is supposed to empower groups, not just to flee the
national government, but also to influence its direction—that is, to
exercise some measure of political control. This is the view famously
elaborated by Publius in a series of Federalist Papers arguing that
the system of constitutional federalism would allow “[t]he different
governments ... [to] control each other, at the same time that each
will be controlled by itself.”165 One channel of state control over the
national government would flow through the formal institutions of
democratic politics: state representation in the Senate and the
Electoral College, state legislative control over House electoral
districts, and the like. This is the “political safeguards of federal-
ism” idea, which dates back to the Founding and remains influen-
tial in contemporary constitutional law and theory.166 At least from
the perspective of the Founding generation, political control could
also operate through other channels. Recall the importance of state
militias in the Founding debates 167: state governments would stand
ready to rally their citizens against federal tyranny and lead them
in armed opposition if need be.168 Whatever the precise pathway,
the least common denominator idea is that states will have
165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 38, at 323 (James Madison).
166. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 38, at 291 (James Madison); Larry D.
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 215 (2000); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543 (1954). A variation on this line of argument emphasizes the ways in which cooperative
federalism and other governance arrangements give state-level and local-level minorities a
“muscular form of voice” in setting national policy. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7, 108 (2010).
167. See CORNELL, supra note 45, at 60, 92.
168. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 38, at 300 (James Madison) (“[S]chemes of
usurpation [by national officials] will be easily defeated by the State governments, who will
be supported by the people.”). The Founding generation believed that the defensive capacity
of the states against national power would soon be bolstered by the Bill of Rights, which was
initially conceived largely as a means of protecting state and local institutions of self-
government—the aforementioned militias, but also juries, churches, schools, and
legislatures. These institutions were supposed to serve as bulwarks against corrupt or
tyrannical federal officials. See supra note 103; see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Back to the
Future? How the Bill of Rights Might Be About Structure After All, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 977
(1999) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998)) (elaborating this understanding).
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sufficient political control over the national government to keep it
safely in line.
But there is a third way that constitutional federalism is, or was,
supposed to protect us against state power. At the time of the
Founding, federalism was understood not just as a means of exiting
or controlling the power of the national state, but also as a means
of preventing that power from being developed in the first place.
The idea was that the already well-developed governance capacity
of states and localities would obviate any need for extensive
national state-building. State and local governments would do most
of the heavy lifting of governance work, allowing the national
government to remain safely small and weak. We might call this a
strategy of incapacitation by means of substitution: governance
capacity at the state level would substitute for, and crowd out the
development of, capacity at the national level.169
As the Founding generation well understood, this kind of
substitutionary dynamic is a common feature of state-building
processes. A state that lacks adequate capacity to control its
territory and population must choose between two options. One is
to build its own capacity, which requires substantial investments
of time and resources, as well as the ability to overcome entrenched
resistance. An easier path, it often turns out, is to cede governance
authority to some other entity that already possesses greater
capacity and that can be induced to cooperate with the principal
state.
This is the strategy of “indirect rule.”170 For early states that
lacked the means to govern directly, indirect rule was a necessity.171
Even as monarchs built professional military forces and began to
monopolize the means of violence in their territories, none pos-
sessed, or could afford to build, a bureaucratic apparatus capable of
169. A similar phenomenon is the “sucking out” of state capacity that can occur in the
context of state-building and international development efforts: “The international
community ... comes so richly endowed and full of capabilities that it tends to crowd out
rather than complement the extremely weak state capacities of the targeted countries. This
means that while governance functions are performed, indigenous capacity does not
increase.” FUKUYAMA, supra note 14, at 103.
170. See John Gerring et al., An Institutional Theory of Direct and Indirect Rule, 63
WORLD POL. 377 (2011).
171. See TILLY, supra note 3, at 104.
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governing a population larger than that of a small city-state.172 So
monarchs relied on collaboration with local magnates who were
capable of exercising direct control over subsets of population and
territory. This typically involved some sort of bargain through
which the monarch secured a certain measure of political control
over, and a flow of revenues from, local powerholders in exchange
for protection and other benefits from the center. But the local
powerholders under these arrangements maintained substantial
autonomy over how they governed and were in a position to resist
any demands from the center that did not serve their interests.173
This placed severe limits on what the central state was able to
accomplish or extract.
Indirect rule would later be replicated as a strategy of colonial
governance.174 Colonial powers that did not want to invest the
resources required to build an elaborate governance infrastructure
in their territories chose to devolve authority to preexisting local
powerholders vested with “traditional” or “customary” authority.175
Well known examples from the British Empire include the Princely
States of India176 and Lord Lugard’s Nigeria.177 Even where British
colonial governance was nominally direct, with a British official
formally at the helm, the challenges of governing at long distance
often resulted in substantial local autonomy on the ground. This
was the case in the American colonies, where the British govern-
ment lacked the resources and administrative capacity to exercise
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See MATTHEW LANGE, LINEAGES OF DESPOTISM AND DEVELOPMENT: BRITISH
COLONIALISM AND STATE POWER 21-33 (2009).
175. See id. at 24.
176. See generally Lakshmi Iyer, Direct Versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term
Consequences, 92 REV. ECON. & STAT. 693 (2010).
177. See FREDERICK LUGARD, THE DUAL MANDATE IN BRITISH TROPICAL AFRICA (1922).
Similar systems of indirect rule were established by Spain in the Americas, by the Dutch in
the East Indies, and by France in Vietnam, Tunisia, and elsewhere. See LANGE, supra note
174, at 199-205.
The incapacitating effects of substitutionary government can be quite enduring. Lange
finds that British colonies that had been subject to indirect rule continue to suffer, relative
to directly ruled colonies, because their central state capacity remains under-developed. The
advantage of direct rule was greater investment by the British in the construction of
centralized, territory-wide political and bureaucratic infrastructure that could be bequeathed
to the post-colonial state. Indirectly ruled states, by comparison, had to be built from scratch;
many remain works in progress. Id. at 4-8.
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direct, day-to-day control, leaving the colonies to a considerable
extent self-governing.178
Federal arrangements in contemporary states can also be
understood as a form of indirect rule.179 Federal systems tend to
result from a pattern of political development in which the central
state either lacks the power to subsume localized governments,180
or lacks the motivation because these governments come with
capabilities that the central state can put to good use.181 Thus,
preexisting entities that possess the “infrastructural capacity” to
“tax, maintain order, regulate society, and generally govern their
societies” tend to be maintained as subsidiary governmental units
even as they are absorbed into a larger state with a centralized
government at its core.182
From the perspective of the center, then, indirect rule is a means
of leveraging third-party governance capacity in order to extend
state power. From the perspective of the governed, however,
indirect rule can be viewed as a strategy of limiting central state
power. Indirect rule is not just a consequence of central state
incapacity but also a cause. Rather than building its own capacity,
the central state comes to rely upon the resources and capabilities
of decentralized units. This in turn tends to entrench opposition to
central state expansion on the part of decentralized powerholders,
who are loathe to give up their power and have often built up
enough of it to get their way. Contemplating the imposition of
greater direct rule by the Crown over the American colonies in the
late seventeenth century, the Earl of Sandwich cautioned that “they
are already too strong to be compelled.”183
Eventually the colonies would be strong enough to cast off British
rule altogether and become independent—or United—states. By the
time of the constitutional Founding, many Americans had come to
appreciate the virtues of indirect rule and local autonomy as means
178. See J. H. ELLIOTT, EMPIRES OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD: BRITAIN AND SPAIN IN AMERICA,
1492-1830, at 140, 149-52 (2006); FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 164, at 98.
179. See Gerring et al., supra note 170, at 404-11.
180. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM 3-5 (1964).
181. See DANIEL ZIBLATT, STRUCTURING THE STATE 2-3 (2006).
182. Id. at 3; see also Gerring et al., supra note 170, at 385 (comparing preexisting political
institutions to physical infrastructure—buildings, roads, railroads, telephone systems, and
the like—which are more likely to be repurposed than destroyed and rebuilt from scratch).
183. See ELLIOTT, supra note 178, at 149.
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of guarding against the predations of a central state. The lesson
that Anti-Federalists took from the Revolution was that as long as
state governments held on to greater governance and military
capacity than the center, they could keep their citizens safe. This
translated into a deep commitment to federalism: Anti-Federalists
were obsessed with preventing the national government from
“consolidating” the states into oblivion, sucking up their authority
and resources and exercising unrivaled and unmediated power over
the citizenry.184
Consequently, Anti-Federalists fought along multiple dimensions
to keep as much governance capacity as possible securely located in
the states and localities and out of the hands of untrustworthy
federal officials. Rather than allowing the national government a
standing army of its own, it would remain dependent on state
militias. Rather than sending hordes of federal tax collectors
trampling through the country, the national government would rely
on customs duties that could easily be collected at ports and, failing
that, on state officials to do the work of tax collection.185 Rather
than appointing cadres of federal judges and building federal
courthouses, state courts would do most of the work of enforcing
federal law.186 And more broadly, rather than building its own
elaborate bureaucracy, the national government would rely on
states and localities to administer its policies.187 What the Supreme
Court now calls “commandeering” and ironically sees as a violation
of states’ rights, was originally conceived as a crucial safeguard of
the primary role of states in carrying out national governance, in
line with the longstanding logic of indirect rule.188
184. See CORNELL, supra note 45, at 30; RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 148.
185. See EDLING, supra note 39, at 185-205.
186. See id. at 225; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 38, at 177 (Alexander
Hamilton) (“[T]he legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members will be
incorporated into the operations of the national government ... and will be rendered auxiliary
to the enforcement of its laws.”). 
187. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 833
(1998) (“Anti-Federalists—quintessential defenders of state power—wanted the national
government to rely exclusively on the state governments to implement national policy.”);
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2005 (1993)
(“[T]hose who feared that a gargantuan federal bureaucracy would overpower the states were
reassured that existing state officers could carry out federal tasks.”).
188. See generally Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122
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This is, to a considerable extent, how federalism in the early
Republic developed. States and localities retained primary regula-
tory authority over economic and family life and carried most of the
weight of governance. The peacetime standing army remained
minuscule. In 1840, the national government employed approxi-
mately 20,000 people, 14,000 of whom worked for the post office.189
In place of the centralized bureaucratic capacity that defined
European states, America operated with a decentralized adminis-
trative framework constructed loosely through the locally-grounded
institutions of courts and political parties.190 Through the Civil War,
the national government remained “a midget institution in a giant
land.”191
Only in the late nineteenth century, when industrialization and
the growth of an integrated national economy began to create
functional demands for more centralized state power, did the size
and capacity of the national government begin to grow. The
Progressive Era saw the creation of the first federal regulatory
agencies to implement national-scale economic regulation, as well
as the establishment of a central bank (the Federal Reserve) and a
national police force (the Federal Bureau of Investigation). The
revenue-raising capacity of the national government was enhanced
by the Sixteenth Amendment. The growth of the national state
escalated through the New Deal, when the federal civil service
nearly doubled in size and budget, and continued through World
War II and the “Rights Revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s.192 The
net result has been a wholesale transfer of power from the states to
the national government and a greatly enhanced capacity for direct
control over citizens by an increasingly centralized American state.
Even so, the idea of federalism as a means of limiting the
capacity of the national government may not be entirely obsolete.
States continue to command capabilities and resources including
schools, police forces, and legal systems that might otherwise
migrate to the national government. Our system of “cooperative
federalism,” in which state and local governments play a pervasive
YALE L.J. 1104 (2013). 
189. Katznelson, supra note 61, at 89.
190. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 42, at 19-35.
191. EDLING, supra note 39, at 228 (quoting historian John Murrin).
192. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 114, at 18-29.
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role in implementing federal regulatory programs, continues to
limit the direct governance capacity of the national state and
empowers states and localities to become “uncooperative” when
vital interests come under federal threat.193 Of course, after the
Civil War and the Civil Rights Era, the view of state governments
as guardians of liberty has lost much of its luster. Nonetheless, for
better or for worse, federalism as a mechanism of incapacitation
remains recognizable as a living feature of our constitutional
tradition.
CONCLUSION
I have tried to show how strategies of state-building, state-
controlling, and—less familiar but equally important—state-
unbuilding co-exist and interrelate in constitutional design and
development, and more broadly in the realms of domestic and
international statecraft. Let me conclude by returning to an
example that was mentioned already in passing: the ongoing
debates over National Security Agency (NSA) eavesdropping and
data mining operations.
The ever more massive and comprehensive surveillance and
information-gathering capacity developed by our National Surveil-
lance State in the post-9/11 period presents a rather obvious set of
benefits and risks. The state can make use of “surveillance, data
collection, and data mining technologies not only to keep Americans
safe from terrorist attacks but also to prevent ordinary crime and
deliver social services” and to “protect[ ] key rights.”194 At the same
time, however, the Surveillance State threatens to erode privacy
and civil liberties in ways that technologically primitive precursors,
like the KGB and the Stasi, could only dream of. Recall the 1941
map of Amsterdam.195
Concerns about these risks have led in two predictable directions.
One is to call for greater legal and political control over otherwise
unlimited intelligence-gathering capacities. Legal control could be
bolstered by way of constitutional and other legal constraints on
193. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L.J. 1256 (2009).
194. Balkin, supra note 67, at 4.
195. See discussion supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
2014] INCAPACITATING THE STATE 225
how information gathered by the NSA and other intelligence
agencies can be used, or by adding teeth to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) court review process.196 Political control
could be enhanced by increasing transparency and dialing up
oversight of the executive branch by Congress, inspectors general,
or the public at large—enabling accountable officials if not citizens
at large to “watch the watchers.”197
The alternative, of course, is to dismantle or roll back the
capacity of the National Surveillance State.198 This might be
accomplished through legal or technological limitations on the kind
of data the NSA and other intelligence agencies are permitted to
gather, as opposed to limiting only particular uses;199 uninstalling
196. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, A Better Surveillance Court, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2013,
at A11 (proposing a new selection process for the FISA court); James G. Carr, A Better Secret
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2013, at A21 (proposing that Congress authorize the FISA judges
to appoint independent lawyers to oppose the government’s requests for warrants in certain
situations).
197. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 196 (proposing the appointment of a powerful
inspector general for the NSA); Adam Liptak & Jeremy W. Peters, Congress and Courts
Weigh New Attempts to Scale Back N.S.A. Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2013, at A16
(describing a bill proposed by Senator Wyden that would “create a battery of new disclosure
requirements for the intelligence agencies” but that “purposefully contains nothing about
banning N.S.A. data collection methods”); Paul Rosenzweig, The NSA Doesn’t Need Wholesale
Reform, Just Greater Oversight, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.
com/article/115392/nsa-reform-not-essential-congressional-oversight [http://perma.cc/73J7-
X4CL].
198. There is some historical precedent in this country for doing so. Just a decade ago the
government abandoned John Poindexter’s Total Information Awareness program, a
precursor to the NSA’s current data mining operations, in the face of public outrage. See Fred
H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 435, 450-51 (2008). In the wake of the Rockefeller Commission and Church Committee
investigations and subsequent reforms in the 1970s, the Central Intelligence Agency’s covert
action capabilities were effectively gutted. See Tim Weiner, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY
OF THE CIA 346-49, 354 (2007); Arthur Herman, The 35-Year War on the CIA: The Campaign
to Discredit the Agency Continues to be a Leftist Obsession, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1, 2009, at 9,
10-22.
199. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Momentum Builds Against N.S.A. Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2013, at A1 (describing a proposal in the House to defund the NSA’s
telephone data collection program, the House Intelligence Committee’s consideration of
requiring changes in the way data collected by the NSA is stored, and other Congressional
efforts to curtail NSA surveillance); Brian Fung, Sen. Feinstein Unveils Her Own Bill
to Reform the NSA's Spying Practices, THE SWITCH (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/26/sen-feinstein-unveils-her-own-bill-to-
reform-the-nsas-spying-practices/ [http://perma.cc/B4AC-FMJM] (describing a bill proposed
by Senator Ron Wyden that would put an end to the NSA’s metadata collection program).
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the video cameras that now provide blanket surveillance of core
areas of London and New York City;200 or resurrecting and reinforc-
ing the legal, administrative, and cultural “walls” that have been
used to separate intelligence from law enforcement operations and
foreign from domestic intelligence gathering.201
 The case for incapacitating the National Surveillance State rests
in part on skepticism about its utility combined with pessimism
about the motivations of the modern-day equivalents of J. Edgar
Hoover. The case also emphasizes doubts about the efficacy of legal
and political controls, fomented by a record of congressional and
judicial passivity and the difficulty of reconciling the need for
secrecy with meaningful political accountability. On the other hand,
the costs of incapacitation are potentially very high. As one
prominent defender of the NSA recently put it: “Yes, I worry about
potential government abuse of privacy from a program designed to
prevent another 9/11 .... But I worry even more about another
9/11.”202
The structure of this debate should by now be familiar. State
power is always a double-edged sword. In an effort to wield it
safely, our first recourse is to some combination of legal and
political control. When that fails, however, and the downside risks
loom large, we may turn to strategies of reducing state power, or
preventing it from developing in the first place. Even in an age of
ambitious state-building projects—now, or at the time of the
American Founding—the possibility of unbuilding, or incapacitat-
ing, the state is always also on the table.
200. See Cara Buckley, Police Plan Web of Surveillance for Downtown, N.Y. TIMES, July
9, 2007, at A1.
201. See David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of the FISA Wall, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 487,
487-89 (2006).
202. Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Blowing a Whistle, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2013, at A27.
